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Historical Case Studies

Human institutions have grappled with entanglement for centuries. These cases illustrate how passive correlation, active influence, and capture manifest in practice.


Case 1: Enron and Arthur Andersen (Auditor Capture)

Section titled “Case 1: Enron and Arthur Andersen (Auditor Capture)”

Enron became one of the largest corporate frauds in history. Arthur Andersen, one of the “Big Five” accounting firms, was supposed to independently audit Enron’s financials but instead signed off on fraudulent statements.

TypeMechanismEffect
FinancialAndersen earned $52M/year from Enron (audit + consulting)Incentive to keep client happy
Personnel86 Andersen employees moved to EnronBlurred organizational boundaries
CulturalBoth based in Houston, shared social networks”We’re all friends here” mentality
InformationAndersen relied on Enron for understanding complex transactionsContext contamination
PhaseIndicators
Professional (1985-1995)Standard audit relationship
Partnership (1995-1998)Consulting fees exceed audit fees
Dependence (1998-2000)Enron becomes Andersen’s largest client
Captured (2000-2001)Andersen signs off on fraudulent statements
Collapse (2001-2002)Fraud revealed; both entities destroyed
  1. Revenue dependency creates capture risk — If a verifier depends economically on the agent it verifies, independence is compromised
  2. Revolving doors blur boundaries — Personnel movement between agent and verifier creates shared perspective
  3. Gradual capture is invisible — Each step seemed reasonable; the pattern only became clear in retrospect

Case 2: Credit Rating Agencies and 2008 (Correlated Failure)

Section titled “Case 2: Credit Rating Agencies and 2008 (Correlated Failure)”

Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch are supposed to provide independent assessments of security risk. Before 2008, they rated mortgage-backed securities as AAA (safest) when they were actually high-risk.

The “issuer pays” model created fundamental capture:

  • Banks paid for ratings and could shop between agencies
  • Agencies that gave tougher ratings lost business
  • Result: Race to the bottom
TypeMechanismEffect
Economic captureAgencies paid by issuers they rateIncentive to inflate ratings
Competition captureBanks shopped for best ratingsRace to the bottom
Correlated methodologyAll agencies used similar modelsShared blind spots

Despite having three “independent” rating agencies, they all failed together:

  • Similar quantitative models (passive entanglement)
  • Same issuer-pays incentive structure (economic capture)
  • Relied on same data from issuers (context contamination)

Three agencies using similar methods failed identically.

  1. Multiple providers ≠ independence — Three agencies using similar methods failed together
  2. Incentive alignment is structural — The “issuer pays” model made capture inevitable
  3. Diversity in method, not just provider — True independence requires fundamentally different approaches
  4. The principal matters — Who pays the verifier determines whose interests the verifier serves

Case 3: Boeing 737 MAX and the FAA (Self-Certification)

Section titled “Case 3: Boeing 737 MAX and the FAA (Self-Certification)”

The FAA delegated significant certification authority to Boeing itself. Boeing certified the MCAS system (which later caused two fatal crashes) with insufficient FAA oversight.

TypeMechanismEffect
Resource captureFAA lacked resources for full oversightForced delegation
Expertise captureBoeing knew the system better than FAAInformation asymmetry
Personnel captureDesignees worked for Boeing, not FAAConflicting loyalties
Regulatory captureBoeing lobbied for delegation rulesWrote the rules governing itself
  1. Boeing classified MCAS as a minor system (not requiring deep review)
  2. Boeing designees approved Boeing’s classification
  3. FAA trusted the designee judgment
  4. Independent FAA engineers were overruled or bypassed
  1. Self-certification is captured by design — When the agent certifies itself, independence is impossible
  2. Resource constraints force dangerous delegation — FAA couldn’t hire enough engineers. AI oversight may face similar pressures.
  3. Classification gaming — Agents may classify their own work to avoid rigorous review. AI systems could learn similar strategies.
  4. Commercial pressure affects everyone — When both agent and verifier are under deadline pressure, oversight suffers

PatternEnronRatingsBoeing
Economic capture
Information asymmetry
Revolving door
Shared methodology
Self-certification

All cases followed similar progression:

IndependentProfessional relationshipTrust developsDependency formsCapturedFailure

Each step seemed reasonable; the pattern only became clear in retrospect.


  1. Structural separation — Economic independence between agent and verifier
  2. Mandatory rotation — Time limits on relationships
  3. Methodological diversity — Fundamentally different verification approaches
  4. External accountability — Oversight of the overseers
  5. Whistleblower channels — Paths for concern escalation that bypass normal hierarchy

Harder for AI:

  • Information asymmetry may be worse (AI harder to understand than financial instruments)
  • Speed (AI decisions faster than human oversight)
  • Scale (AI operates at scales humans can’t monitor)

Easier for AI:

  • Current AI may not deliberately deceive (though this may change)
  • AI actions can be comprehensively logged
  • AI verification can be tested in simulation

LessonHistorical BasisAI Application
Independence requires structural separationEnron, Ratings, BoeingVerification must be economically independent
Multiple providers ≠ diversityRating agenciesDifferent LLM providers may have correlated failures
Capture is gradual and invisibleAll casesMonitor for capture drift over time
Resource constraints force shortcutsBoeingEnsure adequate verification resources

See also: